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CONCERNS AND CONSTRAINTS 
SITUATION 
Ohio farm families are experiencing a degree of economic distress that 
some say is reminicent of the "depression era. 11 The situation, although 
serious, does not approach the catastrophic failure rate of the 1930s. Sur-
facing from this concern is the judgement that somehow creditors are not 
sympathetic enough to farmers who are experiencing difficulty paying prin-
cipal and interest that are due. Concern is expressed that interest rates 
are too high and that credit institutions have changed the "rules of the 
game" by not renewing loans, not extending loan repayment periods, not grant-
ing "needed" operating loans, changing from asset-based to cash-flow lending, 
and encouraging farmers to liquidate assets to reduce debt and/or enable them 
to make loan payments. This concern is heightened by the increase in, and 
public awareness of, farm foreclosures and bankruptcies. 
Arising out of this expressed concern about the "less than sympathetic 
lender" comes the political request and desire to do something in the legis-
lative arena to alleviate the perceived problem. Thus, "Foreclosure Mora-
torium," "Aggie Bonds," and "Family Farm Assistance" bills are introduced 
to legislate solutions to problems resulting from factors largely beyond 
the control and purview of state government. 
PROBLEM 
The problem is not "unsympathetic lenders that are changing the rules 
of the game and charging interest rates that are too high." The problem is 
more fundamental--the economic climate, agricultural and non-agricultural, 
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has changed. This change has resulted in some farmers perceiving lenders as 
the cause of their financial strife. Lenders have not changed the rules. 
The elements of successful lending continue, as they have been, to be--
security, profitability, and repayment capability. The changing economic 
climate has resulted in eroded security, reduced profitability, and a re-
duced ability to repay debt, on the part of most if not all farmers. The 
"changing rules," as perceived by some farmers, legislators, and public, 
are simply a matter of lenders and borrowers adjusting to the new economic 
realities. For certain, all of what some people are perceiving as rule 
changes has happened, but the rules did not change. The economic performance 
of the farm business, current and expected, has changed, resulting in the 
need for precedent adjustment in agricultural credit--supply and use. 
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE 
·Given that the agricultural economy, not the lending institutions, is 
the cause of economic stress farmers are experiencing--what is Ohio's legis-
lative responsibility and capability to deal effectively with the problem? 
The depressed and adjusting agricultural sector is controlled by factors over 
which the Ohio legislative body has no control. As such, it is difficult to 
envision what, if anything, the Ohio legislature can or should be doing to 
"solve" the problem or "cushion" its impact. 
The state government has the responsibility for assuring that the legal, 
economic, and social infrastructure exists and is maintained that will per-
mit and encourage lenders to supply adequate loanable funds to the agricul-
tural sector. It also has the responsibility to ensure that those who do 
lend money to farmers have proper and due recourse if loan terms are not ad-
hered to by borrowers; likewise for borrowers in the event lenders do not 
fulfill their obligation. 
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The recent action of the Ohio legislature spear-headed by the Ohio Farm 
Bureau, to permit farmers access to lower interest rate funds supplied through 
the tax-exempt Industrial Revenue Bonding process (i.e. Aggie Bonds) is a 
good example of what can and should be done. The legislature acted in pru-
dent fashion to increase the supply of loanable funds to farmers at a reduced 
interest rate. Other actions under development for presentation to the legis-
lature or under consideration by the body are less favorable. These would in-
clude the proposed "Family Farm Assistance Program" and the "Foreclosure Mora-
torium." 
Although the proposed "Assistance" program has lofty goals it appears to 
be duplicating the efforts of a long-established federal program that is ad-
ministered by the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) for beginning, limited 
resources, and financially distressed farmers. Such a program at the state 
level, operated with state funds, cannot expect to have a better performance 
(repayment) record than FmHA has had. To use state tax dollars in this man-
ner would be unconscionable. FmHA has direct loans and guarantee loan pro-
grams for ownership and operating funds and special programs for emergencies 
and beginning limited resource farmers. It is correct to say that FmHA 
rarely has enough capacity (supply of money or guarantees) to meet the demand 
from Ohio's agricultural community. The proposed "Assistance Program" would 
increase the supply of funds for such purposes. The decision rests on the 
cost to Ohio taxpayers--administrative, monitoring, delinquencies, and 
"write-offs." The costs will be very high in all categories. There is 
little reason, beyond that of political pacifism, for the state of Ohio to 
proceed with such a program. 
House Bill 61 (foreclosure moratorium) is sensitive politically and 
economically. Just as farmers need seed, fertilizer, livestock feed, and 
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good weather, farmers need capital. It is, therefore, a mistake to approach 
the relationship of farmers and agricultural lenders as necessarily adversari-
al. The relationship is really symbiotic, with each side providing a necessary 
service to the other. The lender provides the farmer with the necessary capi-
tal to farm and to maintain the farm, and often his household, until a crop is 
sold. The farmer provides the lender with a market for the lender's "product" 
--money. 
However, the farmer has a limited number of sources to obtain his neces-
sary capital, while many lenders have a diversity of choices of outlets for 
marketing their product. Banks, thrift institutions and insurance companies 
always have the optior. to divert available funds to commercial, industrial, 
and residential borrowers if the farm lending climate entails a higher risk 
of loss for a comparable return on their investments. 
The Farm Credit agencies, Production Credit and Federal Land Bank Asso-
ciations, enjoy an even more symbiotic relationship with the agriculture in-
dustry. While these institutions lack the ability to divert funds to other 
uses, the sheer availablity and cost of funds to these agencies depend on 
the financial health of their farm clients. If farmers default on loans to 
these institutions and the institutions cannot cover their losses by collect-
ing on their collateral, the institutions in turn have less money to lend 
and losses to their investors which must be compensated for by higher in-
terest rates to farmers on future loans. The same is true for other lenders. 
Farmers and the public officials who serve them ignore these basic finan-
cial realities at their peril. Blaming the financial institutions for the 
problems created for farmers by climate, market and inflation in recent years 
is pointless demagoguery. State imposition of protective measures such as 
moratoriums on farm foreclosures may be politically popular in the short run 
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but is guaranteed to have an adverse impact on availability and cost of farm 
credit in the long run. It is a simple fact that lenders who see a potential 
for protracted delay in realizing on farm collateral in default situations 
will protect themselves from the resulting potential loss by charging farmers 
compensatingly higher interest rates in making loans. This assumes that farm 
loans will be made in that state at all. It is also a fact in the lending 
industry that in states with strict protectionist legislation for farmers, 
such as Minnesota where farmers have a one-year redemption period following 
foreclosure sales, lenders with the option of diversifying their market will 
choose to make no or few farm loans. This, of course, impacts on the demand 
for funds upon other sources, with a corresponding effect upon cost to farm 
borrowers. Savings and loan companies, with the recent deregulation of the 
financial markets, are wanting to expand their portfolios to agriculture. 
Passage of a "moratorium" bill will diminish this interest and reduce funds 
available to farmers. 
Furthermore, state action is unnecessary to protect farmers whose situa-
tions can be salvaged given time to work out difficulties. The Federal Bank-
ruptcy Code's Chapter 11 reorganization proceeding provides a mechanism for 
farmers to buy time and freedom from creditor harrassment while they seek 
alternative remedies for their problems. The farmer is already most gener-
ously protected under the Federal bankruptcy laws; a Chapter 11 instituted 
by a farmer, unlike Chapter ll's instituted by most other classes of debtors, 
cannot be converted upon creditors' motion to a Chapter 7 liquidation. Only 
if the Bankruptcy Court determines that a reorganization of a farmer cannot 
be affected, that a farmer's situation is so bleak that it cannot be salvaged, 
can a farmer be removed from the protection of the Bankruptcy Court. 
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Devices such a moratoriums or protracted redemption periods are arbi-
trary and shield both good and bad farmers across the board to the detriment 
of creditors and the individuals who are investors in those creditors. The 
Federal Bankruptcy Court examines each situation on an ad hoc basis and 
tailors the remedy accordingly. With this protection available to farmers 
who can be saved, it is hard to see what further protection is necessary or 
beneficial fram state intervention. 
The results from a recent (July 1984) survey of Ohio farmers will shed 
some light on how they feel about such a moratorium. The 426 farmers re-
spending to the survey were a mix of crop, dairy, and livestock operators. 
Below are some statements characterizing the respondents: 
1. Farmed an average of 372 acres. 
2. 76% farmed less than 500 acres. 
3. 49% had $40,000 or less gross sales. 
4. 74% had less than $100,000 gross sales. 
5. 41% reported zero debt. 
6. 25% reported a 1-25% debt/asset ratio. 
7. 14% reported a debt/asset ratio greater than 50%. 
This group is representative of Ohio's family farm businesses. In the con-
text of this discussion concerning the moratorium bill it is important to 
note their response to the following question, "What credit policy should it 
(FmHA) follow with present borrowers?" It is reasonable to extrapolate their 
response to other agricultural creditors. Their response: 
50% - Continue to present policx of not foreclosing unless all 
repayment efforts have failed. 
14% - Provide a moratorium on all foreclosures to keep distressed 
borrowers operating until the economy improves. 
9% - Provide a moratorium on foreclosures only for selected young 
"deserving" farmers. 
21% - Set a stricter policy on delinquent loans and increase the 
number of foreclosures. 
5% - Other. 
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These respondents, in general (71%), favored continuation of present or 
stricter policies regarding foreclosures. Only 14% were in favor of a 
general moratorium on foreclosures. 
RECOMMENDATION 
The Ohio legislature should not create a "Family Farm Assistance Pro-
gram." The primary objection to such a program is cost, expected poor per-
formance of borrowers, and duplication of FmHA efforts. The Ohio legisla-
ture should not pass a "Moratorium on Foreclosures" bill. The primary ob-
jections here are: (1) It is not needed because the current bankruptcy 
laws (Chapter 11) are already operative to provide a means for protecting 
borrowers during period of reorganization; (2) Such a bill will result in 
lenders decreasing and/or eliminating the supply of loanable funds to Ohio 
farmers; (3) Lenders will be forced to raise interest rates to all farm 
borrowers to compensate for additional risk, time, and loss incurred, and (4) 
Most Ohio farmers (nearly three-fourths) do not favor such legislative action. 
The legislature, however, sees a need and wants to help farmers through 
this adjustment period. The most productive thing it can do is to provide 
funds for developing and conducting research and education programs in farm 
financial management; including credit supply, use, analysis and legal en-
vironment. These programs will assist farmers, lenders, and public decision 
makers to understand and implement the sound use of credit in Ohio's farm 
businesses. 

